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Previous large, muiticenter NASA programs have been accomplished by ak'viding the program into
elonents (e.g., command module, Saturn V booster, Orbiter) that u_re designe_ deveiope_ and
integrated by a prime contractor under the management of a single NASA center. While this metlx_d
minimized the managerial complexiO! of a given prograrr_ it created an ¢mganizational structure within
the age_wy that makes it dtfflgult for new NASA programs to effectively use _ and resources
develop_ for previous programs. Therefore, each new NASA program must essentially start from scratch.
In order to accelerate the movement of humans into space within reasonable budgetary constraints,
NASA must develop an organizational structure that will allow the agency to efficiently use all the
resources it has available for the development of any program the nation decides to undertake. 7his
work considers the entire set of tasks involved in the successful development of any program. Areas
that hold the greatest promise of accelerating programmatic development and/or increasing the
efficiency of the use of available resources by being dealt with in a centralized manner rather than
being handled by each program ina_viduaily are identified. Using this information, an agency
organizational structure is developed that will allow NASA to promote interprogram _. In cwder
for NASA to efficiently manage its programs in a manner that will allow programs to benefit from
one another and thereby accelerate the movement of humans into space, several steps must be taken.
First, NASA must develop an organizational structure that will allow potential interprogram
to be identified and promoted Key features of the organizational structure recommended in this paper
include (1) the establishment of a single office to perform the mission analysis and system engineering
functions across all NASA programs aru_ therefore, to replace the performance of these functions as
part of each individual program; and (2) the establishment of technical discipline agents to perform
subsystem management on an agency.wide basis, as opposed to having each NASA center provide its
own subsystem managers to support the development of those elements for which the center is
responsible. Secoru_ NASA must begin to develop the requironents for a program in a manner that
promote overall space program goals rather than achieving only the goads that apply to the program
for which the requirements are being developed. Finally, NASA must consider organizT"ng the agency
around the functions _ to suplngrt NASA's goals and objectives rather than around geographic
locations. If we are serious about moving toward the permanent presence and expansion of humans
into space, NASA must organize itself to be able to treat the space program as a program rather than
as a collection of ina_vidual initiatives.
During the early years of the Space Age, American endeavors
in the area of manned spaceflight were generally accomplished
through a series of relatively independent programs with fairly
specific and well-defined goals. Often these programs were
developed by dividing the program hardware into elements
(usually, manned spacecraft elements and booster elements) that
were designed, developed, and integrated by a single (prime)
contractor under the management of a single NASA center. In
1988 President Reagan announced a "Space Policy and Commer-
cial Space Initiative to Begin the Next Century," which contained
the following major components: (1)establishing a long-range
goal to expand human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit
into the .solar system; (2)creating opportunities for U.S. com-
merce in space; and (3)continuing our national commitment to
a permanently manned space station.
In order to accomplish the ambitious, broadly defined kinds of
goals that this policy set for the nation, NASA must be capable
of undertaking a variety of highly interactive and dynamic pro-
grams with goals that will change and develop as each of these
programs is defined and realized. Because the existing NASA
organizational structure was developed to enable the agency to
respond to programs of a specific, well-defined nature, it is
desirable to review this structure in terms _ff its capability to
respond to the kinds of challenges that NASA will be undertaking
in order to fulfill the charges of the national space _flicy. This
paper examines the organizational structure currently in existence
for the implementation of NASA programs, and proposes an agen-
cy architecture structured to provide the flexibility NASA requires
in order to efficiently accomplish the kinds of programs involved
in the achievement of our national goals in space.
Figure 1 presents an overview of the flow of the major functions
involved in the development of a typical program. (For the sake
of clarity, this flow is presented in a very basic and straightforward
manner. The actual process, however, is highly interactive and
iterative. ) The mission analysis function collects the necessary data
and performs the analyses required to transform the top-level
goals and constraints for the program into a set of quantified
requirements that tells the engineers responsible fur designing the
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Fig. 1. Overview of the flow of a prt_jam.
system, in specific terms, just what they are supposed to design
the system to be able to do. The mission requirements, which
are output as the product of the mission analysis activity, serve
as an input to the system engineering function of the total system
that defines the configuration of the most efficient (lowest total
cost) system capable of meeting the performance parameters
specified by the mission requirements. To "define" the configu-
ration of the system means to determine and specify the elements
that compose the system, along with the requirements on each
of these elements. The word "element," as used in this paper,
refers to an essemially modular part of the total system in which
the subsystems are relatively self-contained. Usually, though not
always, this "modular, self-contained subsystems" property of an
element is caused by the fact that the element functions as a
separable, independent unit during some phase of the mission.
The command module, the lunar module, the Saturn V booster,
and the solid rocket boosters are all examples of elements.
Although it does not separate during the mission, the main
engines module of the space shuttle is also considered to be an
element since it does fit this modular, self-contained subsystems
definition. Additionally, this element is treated as an independent
unit during processing. Under the above definition of an element,
the mannedcore portion of the space station would be considered
to be a single element that is divided into several subelements
for development and assembly purl_ses.
The element requirements output by the total system system
engineering function serve as input for the element development
phase of the program. During this phase, elements that meet the
element requirements are developed. In the accomplishment of
this activity, the following major functions are performed for each
element of the program.
1. Individual element system engineering that defines the
configuration of the element that is most capable of meeting the
requirements output by the total system system engineering func-
tion; to "define" the configuration of an element means to de-
termine and specify the requirements on each subsystem
(including the element unique equipment, which is also treated
as a subsystem during this analysis) of the element.
2. Subsystems development that develops each subsystem in
accordance with the subsystem requirements defined by the
individual element system engineering function.
3. Element integration that combines the developed subsys-
tems into an element that meets the requirements levied on the
element by the total system system engineering function.
The final major function that must be performed in suplx)rt of
the development of a typical program is the system integration
function, which combines the developed elements into a tot',d
system that meets the requirements levied on the .system by the
mission analysis fimction.
To accomplish the earlier major, manned programs for which
NASA was responsible, such as the Apollo and space shuttle
programs, NASA, together with its Phase B contractors, performed
the total system system engineering function, which defined the
elements constituting the total system and produced a set of
requirements on each of these elements. These requirements
were then used to write the Phase C/D requests for proposal
(RIPs) for the development of these elements. Generally, one
contract was awarded for each of the elements to be devel(_ed.
This contract included responsibility for the performance of all
the functions involved in the development of the element: the
system engineering function that defined the requirements on the
subsystems of the element (note that here the "system" referred
to in the system engineering function is the element), the de-
velopment of all the subsystems of the element, and the
integration of these subsystems into an element. In addition to
the element contracts, an integration contract (or a separate
schedule) was awarded for the integraUon of the developed
elements into a total system. This integration contract did not
include any responsibility for the integration of an element's
subsystems into the element. This type of element integration was
handled as part of the contract for the development of each
element.
The development contract for each element of a program was
managed by a single NASA center. Additionally, each element of
the earlier major, manned NASA programs could generally be re-
lated to some major function--propulsion, crew support (manned
spacecraft), communications, or operations--required for the ac-
complishment of the program. For the Apollo program, as shown
in Fig. 2a, centers were set up to provide expertise in these areas.
Because the space shuttle was composed of elements with these
same functions, the space shuttle program could be smoothly
managed using the same structure that the agency developed in
order to accomplish the Apollo program ( Fig. 2b).
With the undertaking of the space station program, NASA as-
sumed responsibility for the development of a program that could
not be divided into a set of Apollo-like elements. In fact, ms Fig. 3
illustrates, by the modular, self-contained subsystems definition of
an element, the mannedcore space station is really a single ele-
ment that has been divided into several subelements for
development and assembly purposes. Since, in the case of the
mannedcore space station, the element equals the total system,
only the "inner loop" functions shown in Fig. 1, those associated
with the development of a single element, are performed for the
mannedcore element of the space station program. In order to
handle this situation, NASA had to ch(_)_ between awarding a
single contract for all the functions--system engineering, sub-
systems development, and element integration--involved in the
development of the mannedcore space station element, or
changing the architecture of the agency enough to enable NASA
itself to assume responsibility for the performance of these func-
tions. The first option would allow NASA to develop the man-
nedcore space station element using the same programmatic
methodologies the agency already has in place as a result of sup-
porting its past progrml_S; the second would incorporate _)me of
the element development procedures formerly performed by the
prime contractor for an element and would force NASA to manage
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Fig. 3. Today's programs: A new way of doing business.
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Fig. 2. (a) in the beginning: The Apollo program. (b) Continuing the
tradition: The space shuttle program.
the contracts for the accomplishment of some of the specific
activities (such as the development of a particular subsystem)
involved in the development of an individual element. Previously,
under the single contract method, the prime contractor for the
element awarded and managed subcontracts for the performance
of these element development tasks.
As NASA undertakes the programs required for the achievement
of our national goals in space, it will assume responsibility for the
development of many different types of aerospace systems--cargo
and personnel transports, spaceports, surface habitats of both a
temporary and a permanent nature, mining facilities, and so
forth--that may not easily divide into manned spacecraft and
booster-type elements for development purposes. In fact, as has
already been illustrated, some systems may not efficiently divide
into elements at all. In order to meet the challenges of the future,
NASA will require an agency architecture that is flexible enough
to support the development of a large variety of different types
of aerospace elements.
Additionally, each major, manned program undertaken by NASA
has been the focus of attention of the agency for the duration
of the program and has usually been completed before the de-
velopment of the next major program was begun. Because past
programs had fairly specific goals, each program could generally
be structured as a means to the accomplishment of a limited set
of objectives that terminated (or passed over from a development
to an operational phase) when this set of objectives was achieved.
For this reason, previous NASA programs were accomplished rel-
atively independently of one another. The most notable excep-
tions occur in programs such as Apollo-CoIo3 and Skylab that
used hardware from a previous program. Even these programs,
however, are simply cases of making use of already existing hard-
ware rather than being examples of any type of "global" planning
across several programs. (That is, the hardware was custom
designed for the initial program. Later programs were then
"forced-fit" to be able to make use of this existing hardware
instead of designing the initial hardware to be the optimum
hardware for all the programs that were expected to use it.)
In order to accomplish the broad, long-range kinds of goals
specified by the national space policy, NASA will have to define,
develop, and undertake sets of highly interactive programs that
together achieve a high-level goal. As illustrated in Fig. 4, a lunar
colony may consist of lunar science facilities, observation
equipment for studying the universe, and a LOX facility that will
provide propellants for transports to Mars. Although this colony
is composed of elements that are satisfying the objectives of three
different programs, it may be beneficial to design the colony so
that the crew members supporting these elements all share the
_Lrne habitat (and the same logistics support) and so that the
elements all receive their power from the same power facility.
Though developed under a number of different programs, the
entire set of elements shown in the figure efficiently achieve the
goal stated in the national space policy of "establishing a long-
range goal to expand human presence and activity beyond Earth
orbit and into the solar system." In order for the entire colony
to function smoothly, all the elements of the lunar colony would
have to be designed to "play together" as components of a single
system. Additionally, the elements of this lunar colony would have
to be capable of smoothly interfacing with the elements of the
programs of which they are a part; i.e., the lunar observatories
may have to coordinate with other Earth- or space-based
equipment in order to provide complete data required for a
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Fig. 4. The interactive nature of potential future programs.
particular astronomy experiment, the LOX facility will have to
function in cooperation with the Mars transport vehicles for
which it provides propellants, the entire colony must be able to
interface with its resupply and logistics support network, and so
forth. If NASA plans to undertake this type of ambitious scenario
in the future, it will be necessary for the agency to develop the
capability to define the requirements for each of its new programs
in a manner that enables these programs to efficiently interact
with the other agency programs and thereby promotes the overall
goals of the .space program rather than in a manner that will
achieve only the goals of the individual program for which the
requirements are being defined.
In summary, in order to achieve the goals that the U. S. has
set for itself in .space, NASA will require an architecture that
enables the agency to: (1)develop the requirements on the
elements of future agency programs in a manner that recognizes
and accounts for the interactions that need to take place in order
for the elements of these programs to function together as part
of a sin#e, coordinated, space program; and (2) handle the de-
velopment of a variety of different types of elements.
In past programs, the system tinder development was optimized
to achieve a set of mission requirements that were specific to the
program itself. Any interactions with other programs could
generally be handled as external interfaces with already developed
systems (thereby making these interfaces very specific; such
interfaces could generally be handled as being constraints on the
program). Anticipated interactions, or optimum trade-offs, with
elements of projected future systems were rarely considered.
Instead, when .such future programs did reach the development
stage, they would handle any necessary interactions with the
previous program as being constraints on the new program. This
situation meant that a system could be defined by considering
only those interactions taking place between the elements of the
system itself. If, however, NASA now plans to begin serious
consideration of the interactive types of programs required for the
achievement of the ambitious kinds of goals specified in the
national space policy, it will be necessary to consider the
interactions and optimum trade-offs occurring between the
elements of a number of systems that will be developed at
different times under different programs. This new set of
circumstances suggests that those functions leading to the
definition of the elements of a given program--the mission
analysis and total system system engineering functions (refer to
Fig. 1)--should be replaced by a function that analyzes the
interactions and optimizes the trade-offs between the elements of
all the programs (or potential programs) that make up the
nation's space program. This situation, illustrated in Fig. 5, implies
that NASA should consider replacing the mission analysis and total
system system engineering functions previously performed as part
of each individual agency program with a single "program
engineering" (where "program" here refers to the whole space
program) function that serves the entire agency. An agency
program engineering office should be set up to implement this
function.
Although an explanation of the program engineering process
is beyond the scope of this paper, a few points should be
mentioned. The program engineering process is basically a system
engineering process in which the "system" under analysis is the
entire space program. Beginning with broad categories of missions
that offer the potential for furthering our national goals in space
(for example, perform a thorough scientific study of the Moon,
study the universe beyond our solar system, perform a thorough
scientific study of Mars, and so forth), the specific experiments
and processes (or candidate options for experiments and
processes) required for the accomplishment of each mission
category are identified. The mission analyses and system
engineering studies required to accomplish this set of experi-
ments and processes are performed in such a manner that any
synergies and beneficial trade-offs between these mission activities
and the systems designed to support their implementation are
identified. (The program engineering process would identify, for
example, that some of the equipment used to perform observa-
tions of the universe can, or should be, lunar-based, and that the
crew members required to operate and maintain this equipment
could share a habitat with lunar crew members performing lunar
science experiments and those operating a LOX facility producing
propellants for transports to Mars. The number, character
(content or "set of elements"), and time-phasing of the most
efficient set of programs leading to the accomplishment of the
complete set of input mission categories is produced as an output
of the program engineering process. Notice the "crossovers" that
occur between input missions and the programs in which these
missions are actually implemented. (Some of the observation
equipment used to suptx)rt the Study of the Universe mission
category may be developed as part of a lunar program, and other
EXISTING PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS PROPOSED PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
Fig. 5. NASA program development process.
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equipment supporting such a mission may end up being
developed as part of a low-Earth-orbit program; the LOX facility,
though supporting a Mars mission, may itself be developed as part
of a lunar program; and so forth.) Another important point that
should be mentioned in regard to the program engineering
process is that, although this process should be the responsibility
of a single office (the agency program engineering office), it is
not expected that all the personnel needed to perform this proc-
ess would be located in that office. The agency program engi-
neering office itself should direct and coordinate the studies and
analyses required for the performance of the program engineering
process and should interpret the results leading to the definition
of the elements (and programs) needed to accomplish our
national goals in space. The actual performance of the studies and
analyses required to support the program engineering process
should be performed by the NASA institution located at the field
centers.
Although the establishment of an agency program engineering
office for the performance of the program engineering function
will enable NASA to define the elements of its programs in a
manner that optimizes the interactions between these elements,
the problem of determining an organizational structure that will
allow the agency to efficiently develop any type of element defined
as an output of this process still remains. Figure 6 suggests a
solution to this situation by pointing out that all the elements
defined by the total system system engineering function (or by
the program engineering function that replaces it in the case of
highly interactive programs) are basically composed of the same
kinds (though not necessarily the same architecture) of sub-
systems.
As Figr 7a illustrates, in managing the development of the
elements of past programs, NASA used subsystem managers who
were located at the same center as the project office for the
element they supported and who developed expertise in the types
of subsystems associated with that element. This meant that each
center developed a pool of experts who were adept at under-
standing a particular set of subsystem architectures associated
with the elements that had been developed at that center. During
the Apollo program, which had the unique opportunity of
structuring the agency to meet its needs (see Fig. 2a), and the
space shuttle program, which resembled the Apollo program in
terms of programmatic structure (see Fig. 2b), this subsystem
manager arrangement worked well. However, as NASA moves
toward a future that envisions expansions into new areas of space
exploration and begins the undertaking of the programs required
for the realization of this vision, it is very likely that the current
approach to programs in which almost all the personnel
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Fig. 7. Use of technical discipline agents for consolidation of subsystem
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element(s) for which the center is responsible; (b)p_d subsystem
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agency.
(including the subsystem managers) associated with the
development of an element work directly for the center respon-
sible for the element will prove to be too inflexible to allow NASA
to efficiently manage the variety of new programs the agency will
be undertaking in the near future. One of the problems likely to
be encountered in the future is the need to reassign personnel
and to redirect the use of facilities that were involved in the
development of a program after the program moved into its
operational stage. This problem becomes especially acute when
the center is not assigned responsibility for the development of
a new element (which is one of the motivations behind the
competition between centers that is sometimes observed during
the assignment of the elements of a new program). Another
problem that may be encountered is an unnecessary duplication
of effort between different centers caused by the fact that, under
the current NASA organizational structure, it is easier for a center
to establish its own expertise in a particular technical discipline
than it is to access already established expertise located at another
center. Yet another potential problem is the probability of mis-
matches occurring between center expertise and the assignment
of the development of an element to a particular center. Such
mismatches are caused by the fact that in the past, when NASA
assigned the development of an element to a center, this assign-
ment included the development of all the subsystems within the
element, even if the e_se in some of the subsystems was
located at another center. As NASA begins to assume responsibility
for the development of a large variety of elements, a situation
develops in which the expertise in some of the subsystems of an
element will be located at one center, while the expertise in other
subsystems will be located at other centers. NASA must then solve
how to assign the development of the element to a particular
center while efficiently making use of all the center expertise,
with its associated resources (test beds, research facilities,
databases, and so forth) available throughout the agency. As
Fig. 7b illustrates, one method of alleviating this situation is by
establishing a technical discipline agent for each of the subsystems
involved in the development of a typical aerospace element. These
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agents are groups (possibly divisions or small directorates) of
technical personnel set up to provide support in their technical
discipline to any NASA program requiring such support, regardless
of where the program or project office requiring the support was
located. (In order to maximize the effectiveness of technical
discipline agents, it is recommended that NASA investigate the
feasibility of standardizing the types, though not the architectures,
of subsystems associated with the development of any given
element.) By eliminating the need for each technical discipline
agent to be located at the same center as the office it supports,
technical discipline agents offer one potential method for
providing NASA _4th the flexibility it requires to support a variety
of new programs. As one program ends or scales down for a
period of time, the manager of a technical discipline agent can
reassign the personnel who were supporting the program to new
programs just beginning to require support. Such reassignments
can be made regardless of where the project offices for the new
program are located.
The establishment of an agency program engineering office and
technical discipline agents are suggested as methods for the
solution of specific problems expected to be encountered as the
agency begins undertaking the kinds of progran_ involved in the
achievement of our future national goals in space. Still remaining
is the consideration of an organizational structure, with its asso-
ciated lines of authority or management structure, which
combines these concepts with the other functions required for
the successful accomplishment of a program in a manner flexible
enough to accommodate the development of any set of programs
that the nation decides to undertake in space. Figure 8a illustrates
the current NASA organizational structure in which all employees
located at a given center, including those in any program or proj-
ect office located at the center, are under the direct management
of the director of the center. Each center is, in turn, under the
management of a specific code. During the Apollo program, when
centers were established to provide specific functions in support
of the development of the program, and these functions were
consistent with the responsibilities of the code that managed the
center, such an organizational structure worked well; that is, the
organizational structure was consistent with the structure of the
program it was managing. Since the Apollo p_, however,
NASA has managed the development of an ever-increasing variety
of programs. Taking on new kinds of programs without modifying
the structure of the agency to be consistent with the needs of
these new programs has left NASA with a structure that possesses
significant gaps and inconsistencies in some of the lines of
communication and authority involved in the implementation of
its programs. For example, dut_g Phase B of the space station
program, the program manager did not answer directly to the
associate administrator for the space station program (Code S).
Instead, the program manager answered to the center director
of the center at which the program office was located (the
Johnson Space Center, in this case), who, in turn, answered to
the associate administrator for manned spaceflight (Code M). The
associate administrator for manned spaceflight and the associate
administrator for the space station program were organizational
equals, both of whom answered to the administrator. Similarly,
there were no direct lines of communication between the
program manager and the projects office managers for each of
the work packages of the space station program. Each projects
manager answers to the director of the center at which the
projects office is located who, in turn, answers to the associate
administrator of the code responsible for that center. Today,
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although the program manager (now called the program director)
has been moved to the office of the associate administrator for
the space station p_, the lines of authority directing projects
managers are still somewhat unclear. There are several similar
situations throughout the agency in which personnel involved in
the accomplishment of a program, which is the development
responsibility of one code, work for a center managed by another
code. The lines of authority in these cases are often somewhat
ambiguous. This situation will certainly affect the agency's ability
to efficiently manage the programs it will be undertaking in the
future.
In order to provide more direct lines of authority between the
agents involved in the implementation of future programs, this
paper suggests that NASA consider employing an organizational
structure like that illustrated in Fig. 8b. Under the arrangement
shown in this figure, a program is developed through the Phase B
level (that is, through to the determination of the requirements
on the elements of the program) by the agency program
engineering office, which is part of its own code, separate from
the other NASA codes. Upon authorization of a particular program,
responsibility for the program is handed off to the code that has
been assigned responsibility for the development of the program.
For example, responsibility for the development of an unmanned
planetary exploration program may be handed off to Code E,
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responsibility for the development of a manned program may be
handed off to Code M, responsibility for the development of an
especially large program may be handed off to a new code created
for the management of its development (like the space station
program), and so forth. Upon authorization of a particular
program, the responsible code sets up a program office to manage
the development of the overall program and a project office for
each element of the program to manage the development of its
respective element. Regardless of the location of each program
or project office, all the personnel in the office answer directly
to the program manager who, in turn, answers directly to the as-
sociate administrator of the code responsible for the development
of the program. That is, all personnel in the program-related
offices are badged to the NASA code responsible for the devel-
opment of the program. (This situation is somewhat analogous
to that employed by the Air Force in which all personnel under
a particular Command are considered to be part of that Command
regardless of the base at which they are physically stationed.)
Additionally, Fig. 8b recommends the establishment of a new code
to be responsible for the management of the facilities of all the
centers in the agency. All centers would be managed by this code
(i.e., all center directors would be under the authority of the as-
sociate administrator for this code), which, through its center
directors, would be responsible for insuring that the personnel
located at each center were provided with the proper resources
and support required to accomplish their job, no matter which
agency code they were attached to. Additionally, any personnel
who were specific to the center, like the technical discipline
agents located at the center, would be under the managerial au-
thority of the center director who, in turn, would be under the
authority of the associate administrator for the center manage-
ment code. The technical discipline agents would provide tech-
nical support in their disciplines to all NASA program and project
offices as well as to the agency program engineering office on
a "contract for services required" basis. These technical discipline
agents would provide the services previously performed by the
subsystem managers in past NASA programs, as well as the suplx_rt
the agency program engineering office and the project offices will
require in order to perform the program engineering and contract
management functions for which they are responsible.
In conclusion, this paper attempts to provide a strawman
architecture that addres.ses some of the new kinds of problems
with which NASA will most likely be expected to have to deal
as it undertakes the ambitious types of programs suggested by our
national .space policy. This proposed architecture has been devel-
oped by primarily concentrating on concerns that are specific to
the successful development of NA_¢_ programs. In undertaking the
development of a complete architecture for the agency, NASA will
have to determine how the development of the programs for
which the agency is responsible fits into the complete set of
activities with which NASA is concerned. Any architecture
adopted by the agency should, as a minimum, however, enable
it to ( 1 ) determine the requirements on the elements of future
agency programs in a manner that accounts for the interactive
nature of these progrants, and (2) assign the development of any
type of program element to the various factions of the agency that
will be involved in this development in a manner that efficiently
uses all the resources available to the agency. Finally, it is
recommended that NASA thoroughly review any organizational
structure that the agency considers adopting to insure that the
structure is complete and consistent. A collection of isolated
solutions to the individual problems encountered as NASA takes
on the challenges of the future will not be sufficient to see it
through the development and operation of the large-scale, highly
interactive kinds of programs for which it will be responsible as
we move into the next century.

